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5 Codifying ethics
New Labour and the government of 
civil servants
Edward Barratt
Introduction
In the early months of his Prime Ministership in 2007, Gordon Brown spoke of a 
new era of government, of restoring trust in government that would lead to 
democratic renewal, the nurturing of citizenship and effective government 
(Brown, 2010). Against a background of declining levels of political participa-
tion and the need to respond to an array of challenges now confronting the 
nation, from the threat of terrorism to the global economy, the rights and 
responsibilities of British citizens were now in need of redefinition. Amongst the 
issues at stake for Brown were the powers of an overpowerful executive, includ-
ing those executive powers that compromised the independence, neutrality and 
impartiality of the Civil Service. Brown spoke of reviving the aims of the Civil 
Service reformers of the mid- nineteenth century, seemingly intimating new pri-
orities beyond the dominant themes of the Blair era: “business like,” “joined up,” 
“decentralised,” “consumer responsive” and “network and partnership” based 
administration. There was a need for an Act of Parliament, Brown argued, that 
would formalize the legal status of the Civil Service and the Civil Service Com-
mission and promote the proper conduct of government and the good conscience 
of public officials. A particular way of governing civil servants was to serve 
wider governmental objectives, helping to renew politics and society. Subse-
quently, in 2008, a draft Constitutional Renewal Act was presented to Parliament 
(House of Commons, 2008), including proposals to formalize the political 
neutrality of the Civil Service, defining the role of special advisers and requiring 
the publication of a code setting out the core values of the Civil Service: integ-
rity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality. The Civil Service Commission too, 
with its responsibility to uphold the principle of open and fair competition in the 
appointments process and to hear appeals from civil servants in relation to the 
infringement of the Civil Service code, was to become a body established in law.
 This chapter addresses the historical conditions of possibility of Brown’s 
scheme for the government of civil servants. We highlight the role of an array of 
collective and individual political actors and disparate governing authorities, 
beyond the formal political domain, in the emergence of a particular scheme of 
rule. We consider the ideas and practices at stake and the role of an alliance of 
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forces in the emergence of the scheme for codifying bureaucratic ethics. We 
reveal the contribution of Civil Servants seeking to uphold customary ways 
during Margaret Thatcher’s Prime Ministership, Liberals, Social Democrats, 
think tanks and pressure groups advancing critiques of the vagaries of the British 
Constitution and Civil Service organization in the Thatcher years, alongside 
sympathetic elements in the Labour Party. Though Tony Blair’s priorities lay 
elsewhere, a discourse on the identity of the British, developed by Brown in the 
years after 1997, encouraged a revival of interest in constitutional change and 
Civil Service reform. A naturalising discourse on the history of the British and 
the values of the nation, we argue, was not simply a tactic for political advance-
ment in a newly devolved Britain. There were other productive consequences in 
respect of the reinforcement and reformulation of political priorities, as Brown 
looked forward to the era after Blair. But we will comment on the slow and fal-
tering progress of Brown’s programme during the final years of New Labour. 
Problematic political and economic conditions and circumstances, together with 
Brown’s prevarication, meant that the Constitutional Reform and Governance 
Act (House of Commons, 2010) became law only in the final months of his 
Prime Ministership. Critics (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1993; du Gay, 2000; Bevir, 
2005) of recent Civil Service reform have raised an array of criticism of the per-
verse effects and dangers of the pursuit of responsive government and the “lioni-
sation” (Fournier and Grey, 2000) of practices borrowed from the domain of the 
business enterprise. In turn we raise the question of the costs and contradictions 
of a programme of rule that appeared – initially at least – to indicate new prior-
ities for Labour.
Civil Service ethics in question
It is to controversies in the middle years of Margaret Thatcher’s Prime Minister-
ship that we should look for a revival of interest in the ethics of the Civil Service 
that led ultimately to calls for regulation in later years. Clive Ponting, a senior 
official at the Ministry of Defence, supplied documents to the Labour MP Tam 
Dalyell disclosing that, contrary to information provided to Parliament by the 
government, the sinking of the General Belgrano during the Falklands War had 
breached the rules of engagement. Charged under the Official Secrets Act of 
1911, Ponting (1985) claimed that he had been acting in the public interest, with 
a higher loyalty in mind than that of his minister and the government of the day. 
The Judge Sir Anthony McCowan, in directing the jury, argued instead that the 
public interest was as the government of the day determined it to be. The jury, 
after brief deliberation, acquitted Ponting, accepting his argument that he had 
indeed been acting with the public interest in mind.
 At stake in Ponting’s defence was the ideal of the civil servant as an impartial 
and independent adviser to government, not only a loyal servant of the govern-
ment of the day but a truth teller endowed with a deep sense of the public 
interest, core principles associated with the Civil Service reformers of the 1850s: 
Gladstone, Trevelyan and Northcote. To the principles of the division of labour, 
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which owed much to Trevelyan’s experience of the Indian Civil Service 
(Chapman and Greenaway, 1980; Osborne, 1994; Barratt, 2009), the reformers 
of the 1850s added the ideal of an administrative class recruited on merit, pos-
sessed with a deep sense of the interests of the public domain and an independ-
ence of mind. Contesting a regime founded on patronage and all that undermined 
public servants’ good character, the reformers imagined a new moralised and 
thinking class of officials, the embodiment of Coleridge’s Christian Platonist 
notion of a secular clerisy (Colmer, 1959; Osborne, 1994). Public servants would 
help to confront a number of characteristically classical liberal problems of gov-
ernment: securing efficiency and economy in government, promoting a moral 
tone and the public interest, encouraging social harmony and the integration of 
the lower and middle orders. The key technology enabling these objectives was 
the entry exam, enabling a proper measure of selectivity in entrants and viewed 
as a test of independence and perseverance in its own right (Parliamentary 
Papers (PP) 1854, p. 24).
 To imagine that the Northcote Trevelyan report formed the foundations of the 
Civil Service for the next 100 years, as the critics of the 1960s argued (Fulton 
Committee, 1968), would be misleading. Such an analysis understates the resist-
ance that the initiative of 1853 confronted and the slow and haphazard nature of 
change (Chapman and Greenaway, 1980; Barratt, 2009). Similarly, the authors 
of the Fulton Report underestimated the way in which the ideals and aims of the 
reformers of the 1850s would subsequently inspire the administrative imagina-
tion and encourage an array of developments that would in key respects extend 
and modify the original goals. Foremost among the “interpreters” of Northcote 
Trevelyan was perhaps Warren Fisher, the first Head of the Home Civil Service, 
in the years between the two world wars. For Fisher, the absence of a formal 
legal definition of the responsibilities and duties of the civil servant was a dis-
tinctive virtue. The Civil Service should be an organization fully conscious of 
itself, endowed with a cooperative sense and an esprit de corps, nurtured by rec-
reational activities and most especially sports, through competition with the 
armed forces. What distinguished the character of the civil servant, Fisher told 
the Royal Commission (Tomlin, 1931), was an integrity, fearlessness and inde-
pendence of thought. Fisher understood the civil servant as guided by principles 
and precepts that could not be elaborated into any “detailed code” and for which 
the most effective sanction was the public opinion of the Civil Service itself. 
Later Edward Bridges (1950), the so- called arch exponent of generalist adminis-
tration (Chapman, 1988, p. 314) and Head of the Civil Service for 10 years after 
1945, argued in a similar way. Bridges believed that a deep unselfishness marked 
out the disposition of the civil servant, a capacity to put the inherited wisdom of 
a department and a deep knowledge of the constitution to work. Whilst there was 
always a place for specialists in the work of government, the practice of the 
administrator was of a different order: the capacity to see the essential points in 
a situation, to understand preconditions and implications and to anticipate future 
circumstances (Bridges, 1950). And as was fitting for a country without a formal 
constitution, the administration of government was something that could be 
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learnt only in practice, acquired through informal means and by a practice of self 
cultivation.
 For the neo- Fabian reformers of the 1960s (Fulton Committee, 1968) such 
customary ideals and values were simply misaligned with the requirements of 
the modern state and the management techniques and specialist knowledge 
required for effective government. During Margaret Thatcher’s Prime Minister-
ship the same ideals were understood to occlude the real economic ambitions of 
bureaucrats to expand their responsibilities for personal gain (Niskanen, 1973). 
But in the middle years of the 1980s, with Ponting these same ideals provided a 
language for contesting changes to the management of the Civil Service. In the 
aftermath of Ponting and following the Westland helicopters controversy, in 
which a civil servant had been found to have leaked a letter to the press in 
support of her minister, the First Division Association (FDA) of senior civil ser-
vants sought clarification of the duties and responsibilities of public officials. 
After Ponting’s acquittal, the Head of the Home Civil Service (Armstrong, 
1985), argued that the duty of civil servants was first and foremost to the 
Minister of the Crown in charge of a department and that strict confidence was 
essential to the efficient conduct of government. For the FDA (1986), siding with 
Ponting, Armstrong had taken too limited a view of the duties of a civil servant. 
Whilst civil servants should indeed pursue the implementation of government 
policies assiduously, they should also provide honest and impartial advice, 
whether or not this was consistent with the view of a minister. For the FDA, civil 
servants had rightly been the custodians of their own largely unwritten profes-
sional values. Yet an effective response to what the FDA judged to be a funda-
mental change now required a new code of conduct to clarify and reinforce the 
duties of civil servants as subjects of integrity and bearers of the public good. 
The code would also afford a right of appeal to an independent body that civil 
servants could activate, specifically in circumstances where conscience pre-
vented them from serving government or where the implementation of policy 
would entail an infraction of the law.
 Though a right of appeal to the head of the Home Civil Service where con-
science was at stake was introduced in 1987 and incorporated into a new version 
of Armstrong’s memorandum and amendments made to the ministerial guidance 
document, Questions of Procedure for Ministers (Baker, 2000), no further con-
cessions were made at this time. But with the quickening pace of reform from 
the late 1980s, an array of actors both within the formal political process and 
beyond were calling into question how far the organization of the offices of gov-
ernment had departed from customary practices in terms that assumed a need for 
a new codification of norms and values. There were different versions of this 
argument. In some instances, it was primarily a matter of defending customary 
practice against practices, techniques and forms of expertise associated with the 
domain of the business enterprise. Thus, with the growing number of agencies, 
the increasing number of external appointments and the emergence of market 
testing, the implications of change the Treasury and Civil Service Committee 
(TCSC) (1992–1993) argued, had yet to be adequately considered. As if to 
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deflect criticism, the government subsequently (Cabinet Office, 1994) affirmed a 
“wholehearted commitment” to the principles on which the Civil Service had 
been based: integrity, objectivity, political impartiality, recruitment and advance-
ment on merit and accountability through ministers to Parliament. There was no 
conflict between customary ideals and the current direction of change, and gov-
ernment would proceed with an array of further refinements to enhance effi-
ciency and quality of service: new freedoms for the managers of the agencies 
and a new senior civil service, more open to external recruitment and the use of 
personal contracts. Yet for the TCSC, the government response suggested com-
placency (Treasury and Civil Service Committee 1993–1994). Whilst there was 
no inherent contradiction between their schemes and the customary traditions of 
the Civil Service, government had shown indifference both to the effects of con-
tracting on staff morale and the imposition of targets on the agencies. Most of 
all, complacency was implied by the assumption that core principles and values 
would be maintained in a restructured Civil Service.
 The analysis of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee shared much in 
common with that of the Public Accounts Committee reporting in the same year 
(Public Accounts Committee, 1993–1994) but the TCSC would reach the more 
radical conclusion. The preservation of principles and values should not be for 
civil servants and ministers to determine. The case for a new code – to provide a 
benchmark for right conduct, to protect civil servants from being forced to act in 
ways that violated standards and a right of appeal where matters of conscience 
were at stake to a newly constituted Civil Service Commission, henceforward to 
be established in law – appeared irrefutable. Claiming the risk of politicising the 
Civil Service, Conservatives questioned the principle of introducing the law to 
the offices of government. But the proposed code was ultimately accepted by an 
increasingly defensive government and with additional duties for civil servants: 
that they report cases of criminal or unlawful activity to the commissioners.
Arguments for political renewal and reform
By the later 1980s arguments for the reform of the government of civil servants 
were being subsumed in broader programmes of rule. For some upholding the 
good conscience and political neutrality of civil servants was considered a way 
of advancing wider political and social change. Social Democrats (SDP) were 
prominent, with Anthony Lester (1987) challenging attacks from both the polit-
ical right and left (e.g. Sedgemore, 1980) on the British Constitution. In the 
name of democracy, the centralised character of State power was in urgent need 
of reform. An enforceable Bill of Rights, to include the rights and duties of civil 
servants defined by Parliament rather than by the executive, was an essential 
requirement to protect the integrity of civil servants against political 
interference.
 Rustin (2009) characterises the participatory democratic ambitions of the 
intellectual leaders of Charter 88 as an attempt to reformulate a left of centre 
politics in democratic republican terms. In the intellectual circles around the new 
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pressure group a distinctive analysis and critique of the state of the British 
constitution was being developed (Barnett, 1988). Borrowing from Anderson 
(1964) and Nairn’s (1964) analysis of the pre- democratic inheritance of the 
nation, Margaret Thatcher’s authoritarian politics had been enabled by a 
system that relied ultimately on the legacy of monarchical power (Barnett, 
1988). But Charter 88 was intended from the outset to be a cross- party move-
ment. Elements of the SDP and Liberal parties were prominent in the pressure 
group during these years. Charter 88’s demand for political, civil and human 
rights, including the return of the extensive powers and prerogatives of the 
executive to Parliament to enrich and enliven democracy and enable liberty, 
quickly touched the politics of the centre left more widely. Responding to the 
Charter and seeking new political directions in the year after their initial for-
mation, the Liberal Democrats advocated a bill of rights as a means to a new 
pluralist liberal democracy (Ashdown, 1989).
 Enjoying particular influence in Labour circles, and most especially among 
members of the Labour Coordinating Committee (Evans, 1995), the Institute for 
Public Policy Research (IPPR) gave particular attention to the prerogative 
powers of government in fashioning a new written constitution (IPPR, 1990, 
1991). Formed in 1988 by representatives of business, academics and trade 
unionists as an alternative to the think tanks of the new right and allying closely 
with the Charter 88 movement after 1991, the IPPR argued that changes to the 
organization of central and local government had been initiated with scant regard 
for the constitutional implications (IPPR, 1991, p. 7). Political resistance was an 
insufficient response, but enshrining a framework of rules in law and fashioning 
a set of positive rights, which government could not easily meddle with, would 
limit the dangers of the unfettered exercise of executive power. The management 
of the Civil Service was among the powers and privileges exercised by conven-
tion now requiring legal definition. For the IPPR it would be through the norms 
and standards of a professional code as defined and overseen by a newly consti-
tuted Public Services Commission, enjoying powers to investigate breaches and 
infringements as well as the complaints of civil servants, that a constitutional 
weakness would be remedied.
 Of all those who would later enjoy influence in New Labour circles, it was 
perhaps Robin Cook who was most sympathetic to the proposed reforms. Cook, 
an early signatory of Charter 88 in 1988, at a time when the Labour leadership 
was largely hostile to the movement, believed a key insight revealed by the 
Thatcher years was the lack of formal checks and balances in the British consti-
tution. After a decade in power, the absence of constitutional limitation, Cook 
argued, had allowed Conservatives to surround themselves with officials “incap-
able of distinguishing between their loyalty to the political ambitions of their 
Minister and the duty to the nation to provide a Civil Service above party pol-
itics” (Tribune 21 January 1994, cited in Theakston, 1998, p. 16). By 1994 the 
case for wide- ranging political reform was gathering momentum as the Co- 
ordinator of Charter 88 gave evidence to the recently formed Nolan Committee 
(Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1995) on the need for a Civil Service 
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Act. The act they proposed would clarify the responsibilities and accountability 
of civil servants and protect whistle blowers with an enforceable code of conduct 
to uphold the values of impartiality, probity and integrity.
 The Nolan Committee, set up by the Conservatives in 1994 in the immediate 
aftermath of the scandal over MP’s receiving remuneration for Parliamentary 
questions but charged with a broader responsibility to investigate standards in 
public life, shared the assessment that customary neutrality and impartiality was 
at risk in the Civil Service. Reward and advancement appeared increasingly to 
depend on commitment to a favoured ideology. With greater delegation and 
more movement in and out of the Civil Service, greater vigilance over standards 
of conduct was required. Greater attention appeared to have been given to effi-
ciency and effectiveness than the maintenance of these standards. Yet for Nolan 
a code of conduct, though essential, needed to be of a type that would fit with 
convention to be effective. The use of statutory force for the committee’s pro-
posed code to be underpinned by seven principles of public life – selflessness, 
integrity, objectivity, openness, honesty, leadership and conferring new powers 
of appeal to an independent Civil Service Commission – was inadmissible on 
these grounds.
 The government accepted Nolan’s recommendations in January 1996 and a 
new code took immediate effect. Yet, after the publication of the Scott report in 
the same month, the case for a code of conduct with statutory backing was made 
with increasing urgency by an alliance of forces. Robin Cook (House of 
Commons, 1996a) highlighted not only Scott’s intimation of the deception 
of Parliament by ministers over the sale of arms to Iraq but also the complicity 
of civil servants in the deception (House of Commons, 1996a) and the inadequa-
cies of the advice they had supplied. The chair of the Public Service Committee, 
Giles Radice, spoke of the Civil Service as a “national asset” at risk (House of 
Commons 1996b). In common with others (Mandelson and Liddle, 1996), 
Radice saw the problem of politicisation as lying not in the overt use of political 
appointees as in civil servants having become overly familiar with the govern-
ment and the type of advice they wanted to hear. If, as Conservatives now pro-
posed, the Civil Service Recruitment and Assessment Services was to be 
privatized, the ethos of the organization would be in further jeopardy. Now the 
implications of such apparent abuses for the future direction of Labour pro-
grammes for the government of civil servants seemed to become clearer. It was 
a matter of satisfaction, Radice argued, that his party believed not only that the 
Civil Service should have its own code of conduct but that the code would be 
placed on a statutory basis. Such a code would “define civil servants” and their 
values and give a right of redress against abuses by ministers. By late 1996, with 
the ratification of the Cook – McLennan agreement over a shared Labour and 
Liberal Democrat agenda for constitutional reform, it appeared that the inde-
pendent status of the Civil Service and its customary values and norms would 
shortly be defined in law.
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The Blair years – reform arrested
It appeared in the early months of New Labour in office that constitutional 
renewal would be a priority. In the interests of “reviving” politics, addressing the 
political cynicism which had flourished under their opponents and improving the 
efficiency of government, the manifesto had promised an array of constitutional 
changes and a new decentralised and open style of governing (Labour Party, 
1997). On 17 June 1997, in a speech to 600 civil servants representing all depart-
ments and agencies, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster reaffirmed New 
Labour’s commitment to restoring faith in the public service ethos (Clark, cited 
in Local Government Chronicle 19 June 1997). To that end, customary norms 
and values – integrity and incorruptibility, selection and promotion on merit and 
accountability through ministers to a democratically elected Parliament – would 
soon be fortified by a new legal status for the Civil Service code. Clark affirmed 
that the new government would “listen to and involve” citizens.
 Yet there were expressions of concern at the lack of progress on Civil Service 
reform as early as 1998 (House of Lords Select Committee, 1998). In practice, 
New Labour’s priorities for the Civil Service were following a different course. 
The “Modernizing Government” (Cabinet Office, 1999) white paper, the first 
major statement of policy on the Civil Service, evokes a familiar sociological 
inflection in the discourse of New Labour (Finlayson, 2003). In a style familiar 
to Blair from the debates in Marxism Today in the 1980s, sociological argument 
was deployed in making available the facts of a situation in a way that brooked 
no argument (Finlayson, 2003). The established machinery of government was 
simply unsuited to the conditions of the time: social change and advances in new 
technology had encouraged new, more sophisticated and demanding consumers, 
to which governments were compelled to respond. The white paper praised the 
Conservative leaderships of Thatcher and Major for innovations in the deploy-
ment of management techniques and simulated market processes that had 
improved efficiency in the Civil Service. The offices of government should 
become more “strategic” and joined up to address the most complex social prob-
lems and to respond to a tendency toward fragmentation in provision and service 
delivery that had developed under the Conservatives. Government should 
acknowledge the central role of local partnerships in the enhancement of service 
delivery. The key challenge now was that of improving the implementation of 
policy, the responsiveness of the commonly recalcitrant civil servant to political 
goals, particularly in respect of the promotion of quality and choice in the 
delivery of public services. Performance management and other managerial 
innovations – the acquisition of external expertise, the improved use of techno-
logy, action on poor performers and enhanced performance pay – would be 
essential to a newly modernised Civil Service.
 But with the rapid expansion of the use of outside expertise during New 
Labour’s first year in office, in the form of special advisers, and with new execu-
tive powers conferred on three of them, the House of Lords Select Committee 
(1998) warned that both the “collective memory” and the morale of the Civil 
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Service were at risk. The case for the codification of the values and norms of 
civil servants appeared more compelling than ever. The Wicks Committee not 
long after (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2000) raised similar con-
cerns, signalling its impatience with the government’s lack of progress by 
requesting a timetable for the introduction of legislation, to include target dates 
for the consultation process. By 2002, with more than 80 special advisers now 
working for the government and considerable adverse publicity on the effects of 
their influence on the political process (Winstone, 2003), the Public Administra-
tion Select Committee (2002) argued that the protection of the public service 
ethos should be at the centre of the government’s reform programme. With addi-
tional threats to the public ethos presented by the role of private and third sector 
interests in the provision of public services, the committee now announced it 
would be drafting its own Civil Service Act. Given the government’s seemingly 
dilatory progress it would be for the committee to shape the debate over how 
norms and standards might be best codified and scrutinised.
 A distinctive feature of the debates of this era was the growing willingness of 
new political actors – former leading public officials – to enter the argument, 
speaking candidly on the current condition of the Civil Service. Sir Robin 
Mountfield (2002) returned to the problems associated with special advisers, 
arguing that the effects of these changes had not been to politicise the advice of 
senior officials but to encourage their marginalisation in policy- making pro-
cesses. As his own experience as permanent secretary at the Cabinet Office had 
made all too apparent, advisers were now commonly placed in the position of 
conveying guidance to civil servants on behalf of ministers. Legislation was cer-
tainly required to entrench norms of neutrality and impartiality. But for Mount-
field, there were risks attached to the creation of a new legal concept of “civil 
servant”: that officials might come to view their obligations as always above and 
beyond those of the government of the day. More needed to be done not only to 
clarify the obligations of politicians in respect of civil servants but also the 
authority of special advisers and the appointment practices and roles of the 
expanding numbers of seconded staff.
 Shortly after retiring as head of the Civil Service, Sir Richard Wilson (2002) 
sought to update Edward Bridges’ characterisation of the civil servant for a new 
era. Evoking the discourse of New Labour, Wilson wrote of modernisation as 
the overriding priority of the Civil Service. Britain was in the midst of an 
epochal shift, occasioned by the forces of globalization and changes in attitudes 
and technology to which the central bureaucracy was compelled to respond. 
Though there was much still to be done to enhance the quality of management 
required to meet the demands of the new era, it was a matter of pride that so 
much had been achieved: opening the Civil Service up to new talent from the 
outside, improving the quality of leadership and the management and incentivi-
zation of performance. For Wilson, there was no fundamental tension between 
such modernising measures and customary values. It was a matter of common 
knowledge that the best way to protect those values was to show that civil ser-
vants could move with the times and adapt. Yet Wilson could nonetheless see a 
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place for measures that would define the activities of civil servants and relation-
ships between officials and others now playing an increasingly important part in 
advising and assisting government and, in so doing, ensure that nothing of value 
had been lost in the course of modernisation.
 Until 2002, notwithstanding the critiques of New Labour’s inaction and the 
manner in which current priorities exacerbated the problems of the Civil Service, 
the assumption had been that reforms would in due course be forthcoming. Now 
the Committee on Standards in Public Life, concerned at the lack of progress, 
invited staff from Blair’s office to discuss the position only for their invitation to 
be declined (Winstone, 2003). Leading officials were arguing that the real prob-
lems of government lay not in rules and the mechanisms of their enforcement 
but in “culture” and the changing of attitudes (Riddell and Sherman, 2002). 
Above all, the new head of the Civil Service, Andrew Turnbull, argued the 
enhancement of “delivery” and finding ways to match the rising expectations of 
consumers and social change was the central concern. And the pace of reform, 
he insisted, must increase. To that end, the Civil Service was now in the midst of 
a profound transformation with a new Delivery Reform Team in the Cabinet 
Office, comprising both officials and special advisers, under Turnbull’s own dir-
ection. Yet more had to be done to improve the responsiveness of private and 
voluntary sector providers in meeting the need for public services that afforded 
consumer choice and the required national standards of quality and flexible 
delivery.
 By 2002 then, government had communicated explicitly that its priorities lay 
elsewhere. The agitation of the Liberal Democrat Lord Lester (House of Lords, 
2003) and the publication of the Hutton (2004) and, especially, Butler (2004) 
reports and the further amplification of the critique of government’s indifference 
to the advice of officials prompted the publication of a draft Civil Service bill in 
2004 (House of Commons, 2004). But the act itself would never materialise 
during the Blair years. Constitutional renewal – devolution, the Human Rights 
and Freedom of Information Acts – proceeded without the measures to reform 
the Civil Service approved under the Cook–McLennnan agreement. Increasingly 
it appeared to critics that, for New Labour, the proposal of such a measure had 
only ever been a matter of expediency, designed to secure an alliance with the 
Liberal Democrats for electoral advantage, which ceased subsequently to be of 
great importance (Cook, 2004). As key members of the original alliance found 
themselves marginalised by a style of political discourse that admitted no 
opposition (Cook, 2003), the prospects for measures that would codify the activ-
ities of the Civil Service appeared unpromising.
Brown, “Britishness” and constitutional reform
Gamble and Wright (2009) interpret the discourse on “Britishness,” which 
Gordon Brown began to formulate after 1997, as a tactic for personal political 
gain, an astute response to evidence of the declining salience of British identity 
in the context of a newly devolved Britain by an ambitious Scottish politician, 
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anticipating the era after Blair. Yet after 1997 the discourse on Britishness 
should be seen in part for the way in which, in tandem with the Third Way 
(Blair, 1998), it provided a way of affirming and naturalising New Labour’s pro-
grammatic aims and priorities. Further, after the middle years of the 2000s, 
reflecting on Britishness enabled Brown to begin to reformulate political prior-
ities and, it seemed, to fashion the outline of a future programme of government 
for the era after Blair. In particular, the concern with British identity would give 
a new emphasis to constitutional renewal and the problem of the powers and 
influence of the executive.
 Of the many references to historical sources scattered across Brown’s various 
speeches and articles on Britishness (Brown, 1997, 1999, 2004, 2005, 2006), at 
first sight it is the trace of Burke that is the most striking. Britishness embodies 
customary values, reflecting the collective experience of a people rather than a 
“mystery of the blood” (Brown, 1997). Reminiscent of Burke, “modernisation” 
and renewal are licensed to allow for the accommodation of inherited forms of 
life to the exigencies of new times. Brown speaks of the recovery of authentic 
British values and of establishing new institutional forms to reflect those values. 
There are moments when Brown’s history appears to be an explicitly partisan 
and perspectival endeavour, laying claim to no absolute truth. Acknowledging 
Britain’s imperial past, Brown’s history represents the nation “at its best.” Fol-
lowing no predetermined path, the course of events is an effect of political 
struggle and the exercise of the will. Yet Britishness can be read back from the 
present through a golden thread, linking together the scattered historical 
moments that engendered the values of a nation. At the heart of the national 
character is the “commitment to liberty.” Yet the liberty favoured by the British 
has not been of a selfish type; Brown shares Himmelfarb’s (2008) critique of 
Tocqueville’s Amer ican exceptionalism: civic association and civic virtue were 
equally characteristic of the British. Values of personal liberty and moral and 
social obligation infused the thought of Smith, Hume and other contributors to 
the “British enlightenment.”
 Promoting efficient and customer sensitive public services, furthering “com-
munity,” “partnership,” “creative enterprise,” “equality of opportunity” and 
“outgoing internationalism,” Brown commonly constructs a version of British 
history such that New Labour policies, adapted to the “modern era,” go with the 
grain of a national inheritance. After 2005, however, the reflections on British 
identity increasingly follow another course, suggesting a reformulation of polit-
ical priorities and the attempt to fashion the outline of a future programme of 
government. There is no radical break with Blair’s formulations in the Third 
Way (Blair, 1998) but seemingly a new emphasis on political and social renewal 
and certain constitutional ingredients, as means for the advancement of change.
 Brown’s interest in constitutional matters had a longer history. He was one of 
the members of the Parliamentary Labour Party seemingly touched in the early 
1990s by the broad movement around Charter 88 (Brown, 1992). At this time, he 
set his argument for constitutional change in the context of wider debates across 
Europe, in Germany and the former Soviet bloc countries, whilst acknowledging 
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the particular needs of Britain for fundamental change. A “modern view of social-
ism” (Brown, 1992, p. 395) evoked a number of “modernising” themes that had 
already emerged during the years of Neil Kinnock’s leadership (Keegan, 2004): 
state and business partnerships or the community as a resource for achieving the 
aims of social justice under an “enabling” or “empowering” state (Brown, 1992, 
p. 395). But releasing the capabilities and potential of all required an attention to 
the conditions of their liberty. A “modern view of socialism” (Brown, 1992, 
p. 395) in this sense suggested a variant of republican argument, highlighting the 
vested interests of political authorities and the risks of the abuse of political 
powers. Brown thus proposed an array of constitutional measures including 
freedom of information, reform of the House of Lords, devolution and a Bill of 
Rights. And a new and radical settlement between “individual, community and 
government” also required an effort “to reinvigorate the ideal of public service” all 
too often disparaged and undermined by the Conservatives (Brown, 1992, p. 402).
 When Brown (2005, 2006) returned to these themes in the final years of 
Blair’s Prime Ministership, he can be seen as fashioning a position with a par-
ticular constituency in mind: the liberal intelligentsia, which he believed had 
been neglected in the earlier years of New Labour. The case for constitutional 
renewal was made in terms of the need to renew the British “passion for liberty” 
under new circumstances and conditions. Against a background of the continu-
ing decline of levels of political participation and the need to respond to an array 
of challenges now confronting the nation, Brown (2005) argued for new ways of 
engaging people in the political process and fostering a revitalised sense of 
national purpose. In the years after 1945, faced with relative national economic 
decline and the end of Empire, Britain, Brown contended, had lost confidence 
and had failed to face up to a number of fundamental constitutional questions. 
Curtailing the powers of the executive in favour of the legislature, as well as 
enhancing citizen participation and local democracy and instilling a new sense 
of community in tandem with a “national conversation” over a new statement of 
citizen rights and responsibilities, now appeared to be central priorities.
“Renewal” after 2007
Seldon and Lodge (2010) present Brown as a leader without a programme. 
Between 2004 and 2007, an obsession with the pursuit of personal political 
ambition interfered with the development of a coherent programme, such that 
“an agenda for change” (Seldon and Lodge, 2010, p. xxi) became clear only in 
the final months of his Prime Ministership. The plan to formalise the legal status 
of the Civil Service Commission and Civil Service, and to put the Civil Service 
code on a statutory basis, became law only in the final weeks of Brown’s Prime 
Ministership, as part of the amended Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 
(2010), and even this depended heavily on cross- party support. Yet in the light 
of our reflections on the theme of British identity, the criticism appears exces-
sive. In July 2007, when Brown spoke of rebuilding trust in democracy by meas-
ures to invest “more power in the British people” (Brown, 2010, p. 159), of 
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curtailing the powers of the executive in 12 key areas and of beginning a public 
debate on these questions, his scheme should be viewed in the light of the 
various reflections on the identity of the British in earlier years. Thus it appeared 
that Civil Service neutrality, new limits on the powers of special advisers and a 
code of ethics with legal backing, a device not only for maintaining the good 
conscience of public officials but for renewing politics and society at large, 
would soon be established as part of a wide- ranging new programme of constitu-
tional renewal.
 The repeal of the Order in Council licensing special advisers to instruct civil 
servants and the appointment of civil servants to key positions in the Prime Min-
ister’s office appeared to signal a new direction. A new style of government was 
announced at this time (Brown, 2010, pp. 151–182), with consultation papers on 
constitutional reform published and citizens juries on child care, crime, com-
munities, health and education policy (Maer, 2007). Yet the commitment to 
change would not endure. The perception that Brown misled the public over the 
decision not to hold an election in the autumn of 2007, and the scandals over 
party funding shortly after, undermined the claim to be advancing a “new pol-
itics” or style of administration (Seldon and Lodge, 2010). There was a long 
delay over the publication of a white paper, and when it appeared (House of 
Commons, 2008), though the proposal for Civil Service reform remained, the 
proposed measures on constitutional reform failed to reflect the broad ambitions 
of earlier statements. Lacking in clear direction and fearing the political con-
sequences of association with “old Labour,” Brown increasingly returned to 
ideas associated with the Blair era (Seldon and Lodge, 2010), advocating new 
schemes of modernisation, with an emphasis on consumer choice and personal-
ised forms of service provision (Needham, 2011). Introducing what would 
become a familiar periodization of reform, Brown (2008) spoke of a new third 
stage of modernization fashioned as a response to changing social expectations. 
If the first stage had involved the use of targets, league tables and inspection 
regimes to raise standards after years of decline, and the second action on spe-
cific underperforming service providing institutions, the third stage of public 
service reform would see a greater diversity of providers and choice, more per-
sonal to the needs of individuals.
 Lord Lester (2009), appointed as a special adviser in 2007, confirms the lack 
of progress on constitutional reform at this time. With the global financial crisis, 
Labour did not revisit the question of Civil Service reform again until the forma-
tion of the National Democratic Reform Council – effectively a subcommittee of 
the Cabinet – and the publication of Building Britain’s Future in June 2009 
(Brown, 2009) in the final year of his Prime Ministership. Now, in the aftermath 
of the scandal over MP’s misuse of their allowance and expenses entitlements, 
Brown tried to frame the problem in broader terms, returning to the theme of the 
decline of trust in the political process. The long- term problem of “alienation in 
political and civic participation,” it was claimed, had been brought into relief by 
the scandal. The “first and most urgent priority” was to “fight for the interests of 
the British people and clean up politics” (Brown, 2009, p. 1). Building Britain’s 
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Future reaffirmed a new era of public service modernization, adding a new 
emphasis on legally enforceable entitlements for the consumers of public ser-
vices. Civil Service reform was, however, conceived once again as part of an 
ambitious programme of constitutional renewal designed to rebuild trust in the 
political process and strengthen society.
 Yet, Labour, in effect, ran out of time in the 2009/10 parliamentary session. 
The majority of the limited proposals announced in the first reading of the Con-
stitutional Act, including measures for the reform of the House of Lords, protests 
near Parliament and judicial appointments, were ultimately excluded at the final 
stages. The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act became law on 8 April 
2010, less than a month before the election. What saved the measures for the 
Civil Service was the support of the Conservatives, and a cross- party consensus 
on the need to formalise the legal status of the Civil Service that had emerged by 
this time. The Conservatives had developed a critique of Labour’s use of man-
agement consultants and the “alien” and “stifling” performance management 
regime of their opponents. It appeared that they too had come to a sympathetic 
appraisal of the customary ways of the Civil Service (Barratt, 2015).
Discussion: on the codification of Civil Service ethics
How then should we judge the provisions for the Civil Service and Civil Service 
Commission that emerged in the compendium act in the final years of New 
Labour? How should we appraise the value assigned to ethical codification in 
diverse schemes for the government of civil servants? We have highlighted the 
hybrid character of New Labour’s schemes during its final years. The ideal of 
safeguarding the core values of an independent Civil Service, relying on the pre-
cepts of a code with legal backing and contributing to a wider process of demo-
cratic and social renewal, coexisted and ultimately stood in a secondary and 
subordinate relation to priorities of a different kind. In uncertain economic and 
political circumstances Brown revisited, drew inspiration from and extended the 
application of notions of consumer choice and the personalised delivery of ser-
vices popularised during the Blair era, prevaricating over constitutional ques-
tions. Labour, in Brown’s era, appeared to be caught between contradictory 
positions. Measures designed to renew citizenship co- existed with, and were 
trumped ultimately by, an emphasis on meeting the requirements of private indi-
viduals and “citizen consumers.” There was no fundamental break with the aims 
of the Blair era, with the pursuit of “business like,” “joined up,” “decentralised,” 
“partnership based” and, most especially, “consumer responsive” administration. 
Brown was therefore no less vulnerable to familiar criticisms of Civil Service 
modernisation, dating back to the arguments of the FDA and Treasury and Civil 
Service Committee in the 1980s and early 1990s. The problem of how political 
accountability and core principles and values were to be maintained in a more 
politically partial, incentivised, restructured and fragmented Civil Service 
remained unresolved. The question of how public trust in the process of govern-
ment was to be maintained under such conditions equally went unresolved 
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(Crouch, 2004). When the work of government is conceived in large part as an 
expert, technical and managerial activity, the space for the practice of citizenship 
and political engagement must surely contract (Brown, 2015).
 In the years since the passage of the law, government policy has continued to 
exhibit a contradictory logic. The law nominally protects the values of an inde-
pendent and neutral bureaucracy, whilst government, praising the characteristic 
“flexibility” of the Civil Service (Cameron, 2012), pursues measures which 
appear to undermine those same values. By 2010 the Conservatives had already 
arrived at a position in which support for the scheme to formalise the roles of the 
Civil Service and Civil Service Commission combined with an array of planned 
measures designed to encourage more business- like and politically responsive 
administration. (Maude, 2009a). A “cultural shift” (Maude, 2009a, 2009b), it 
was claimed, was required in the light of national economic crisis and the need 
to secure “more output from diminishing resources.” Government should be 
more “strategic” in its approach, with government departments preparing busi-
ness plans and under the control of newly constituted departmental boards, 
chaired by relevant ministers and including nonexecutives drawn from the busi-
ness interest (Barratt, 2015). With greater empowerment individual civil servants 
would be able to display enterprise and inventiveness. All civil servants would 
enjoy the right to request a new mutual or cooperative status (Conservative 
Party, 2009c, p. 7), spinning off from the state and enjoying many of the benefits 
of business ownership.
 In government the Alliance built on these plans, pursuing the advice of an 
array of governmental forces – think tanks and policy discussion groups – pur-
porting truths about the next phase of modernization. Today the extent of con-
sensus in political discourse is evident. For the Opposition, Michael Dugher’s 
(2014) speech at the Institute for Government endorses recent reforms: the 
enhanced role of the Prime Minister in the shortlisting of permanent secretary 
appointments, new powers for ministers to appoint their own advisory teams on 
temporary Civil Service contracts and the creation of a chief executive to oversee 
a range of key strategic projects. Yet the government is criticised by Labour for 
weakening the management of the Civil Service, and the favoured system of 
business planning amounts to an abandonment of management control. A minor 
shift in management practice is proposed, a preference for yet more business- 
like practices in the light of the perceived failure of currently favoured practices 
and an appraisal of the conditions and circumstances of the moment. Compre-
hensive performance management is the favoured remedy to meet the demands 
of increasingly sophisticated consumers of public services and to ensure control 
over more devolved mechanisms of service delivery (Labour Party, 2015). If 
these objectives are to be met, Labour argue, the auditing and enhancement of 
capabilities in the Civil Service should be a priority. Government must become 
more integrated and strategic, transcending “silo management,” if critical issues 
like health and climate change are to be addressed effectively. Dugher’s speech 
reveals that the habit of endorsing the “core values” of the Civil Service, as 
embodied in the Civil Service code, whilst proposing schemes that undermine 
728_05_Governmentality after Neo.indd   85 29/2/16   15:04:13
86  E. Barratt
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
those same values appears to have become commonplace in British political 
discourse.
 Without genuine and consistent political support, the law today seems a dead 
letter. And the weakness of the law has encouraged certain expert voices (Harris, 
2013) to look to foreign example and the possibility of new forms of codifica-
tion, to strengthen the powers of Parliament and limit the “flexibility” now 
desired by politicians (Cameron, 2012). Yet the value of truth assigned to codifi-
cation in contemporary political discourse seems to be in need of fundamental 
reappraisal. Such an aspiration appears guided by a desire to standardize, at odds 
with the work of context sensitive reflection and judgment that an ethically 
guided administrative practice must surely require, whether it be the frank speak-
ing criticism of a proposed policy by a mandarin or the application and interpre-
tation of the law by a junior official. Ethically informed practice in this sense, or 
ethical agency as a mode of bureaucratic self rule, would appear unsusceptible to 
imposition by command (O’Toole, 2006).
 Perhaps, eschewing the will to codify, we might benefit from considering the 
multiple practices and devices of power by which officials might be disposed to 
act in ethical ways. For Bridges, as we have seen, a proper comprehension of the 
arts of administration could be acquired only in practice, through informal means 
and by a practice of self- cultivation. Mechanisms of socialisation, the example 
of other officials and their practice were a surer guide to the acquisition of values 
and standards of conduct than the abstraction of a formal code. Equally, the “tra-
dition” which Bridges sought to characterise in the 1950s depended heavily not 
only on devices of practical training and socialisation but also common employ-
ment standards: fair or model employer standards as they became known in the 
early twentieth century (Gladden, 1967) to nurture and maintain the active 
cooperation and loyalty of bureaucrats. Codes of conduct, as John Uhr (2005) 
argues, cannot motivate the bureaucrat. Indeed the very attempt to codify implies 
an attitude of distrust. Reformers have been concerned, as we have seen, to grant 
rights of appeal and mechanisms of redress against infringements of the code. 
Yet the functioning of these rules, if they are to be more than nominal, must 
surely depend on the existence of an employment relationship in which civil ser-
vants experience sufficient trust and confidence to appeal against infractions and 
exercise their rights.
 The public denigration of civil servants, employment insecurity, the erosion of 
common and fair employer standards and work intensification has done much to 
undermine relations between civil servants and government in the era of austerity, 
with substantial levels of turnover, particularly at the higher levels of government 
(Public Administration Select Committee, 2013). In the post- Fulton era (Fulton 
Committee, 1968), the problematic condition of Civil Service morale has often 
been a subject of investigation, analysis and debate. As Keith Ewing (2007) shows 
“public employment values” have been subject to erosion over time; the effect is 
that the Civil Service no longer leads the market in the treatment of the employee 
but is led by it. And in the era of austerity, this tendency has intensified as civil 
servants become not only responsible, empowered subjects – who must take 
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responsibility for finding solutions to the central problems of government in crisis 
conditions – but also “punishable” subjects, who must lose “lavish” benefits and 
conditions for the sake of the national good (Brown, 2015). Beyond the will to 
codify bureaucracy in yet more ways, perhaps then it is to revision of the mundane 
practices of public service personnel management that we should look for ways of 
nurturing the ethics of officialdom, adapting the thought and practice of Fisher and 
Bridges and the doctrine of the “model employer” for a different era.
 John Uhr (2005) argues that today we require not only mechanisms of power 
for nurturing good conduct among officials, but also additional instruments for 
guarding against misconduct and impropriety, raising the question of how mech-
anisms of accountability might be enhanced. Perhaps here the history we have 
been recounting serves as a useful reminder of varied currents within British 
socialism. By 1992, Gordon Brown, once an advocate of the participatory pol-
itics of the urban new left (Brown, 1975) was, as we have seen, dabbling with a 
variant of democratic republicanism that flowed through the Charter 88 move-
ment (Barnett, 1988). Brown, at this time, in conjunction with his “modernising” 
tendencies, seemingly imagined a vigilant citizenry calling public authorities to 
account and challenging abuses of office. The argument differs markedly from 
New Labour’s primary interest in enhancing “participation” for the sake of 
enhancing the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy and the strengthening of 
society and social capital (Bevir, 2005). The scope and practices of participation 
in New Labour’s favoured style seemed to be determined in advance, notwith-
standing the talk of a “public dialogue” during the years we have been consider-
ing. Brown, in his earlier democratic republican guise, shares more in common 
with those today who imply the need not only for a range of familiar external 
checks to discourage malpractice in government and administration – mecha-
nisms of audit, Parliamentary scrutiny and a responsible press (Doig, 1997) – but 
an educated, “distrustful” citizenry willing and able to speak frankly to govern-
ment (Bevir, 2005). Though these are not arguments we can develop fully here, 
at issue here is the very concept of “accountability” and the need for the widest 
possible public debate over the very terms of the association between citizens 
and the local and central State (Wainwright, 2003; Marquand, 2004; Bevir, 
2005; Newman, 2014). “Representation,” Wainwright for example suggests, 
could be resignified to refer to practices which would seek to make citizens 
present in the administrative processes of the State, a field of political practice 
from which they are customarily absent. Bureaucratic knowledge could be aug-
mented by the customarily disqualified knowledge of the citizen and politicians 
made more accountable by experimentation along these lines. Representation, in 
this sense, could displace forms of influence commonly brought to bear on gov-
ernments and senior officials of the State, the clandestine work of think tanks or 
the organised interests of business and the professions. Perhaps it is in such 
debates that Labour, desperately in need of political reinvention, might find some 
resources for a new style of politics today.
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